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The Mortgage Banker-Industrial Loan
Company: A New Exempt Lender
J. MARK WAXMAN*
In 1973, to alleviate the plight of commercial real estate lenders
caught between the rising costs of making loans and the limitations
on interest and charges, the California Legislature enacted legislation
which authorized the formation of the mortgage banker-industrial
loan company, a new entity intended to fall within the class of
exempt lenders created by article XX, section 22 of the California
Constitution. The author discusses the nature and formation of the
mortgage banker-industrial loan company and addresses provisions
which allow the mortgage banker-industrial loan company to make
assignments or transfers to nonexempt lenders. In this discussion he
concludes that while such operations are generally authorized by the
legislation, the courts will not allow the new institution to act as a
"mere conduit," circumventing the distinction between classes of ex-
empt and nonexempt lenders. Finally, the author discusses he
constitutionality of the mortgage banker-industrial loan company,
marshalling arguments that the institution is a valid subclass of the
constitutionality exempt industrial loan company, that public policy
considerations support an affirmative finding of constitutionality,
and that the creation of the institution does not violate equal protec-
tion of the law.
* B.A., 1970, University of California, San Diego; ID., 1973, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. Assistant United States Attorney, Central District of California. The
author's opinions or conclusions expressed herein are his own and do not in any way
represent the views of the United States, its agencies or officers. The author wishes
to acknowledge the helpful comments of Peter A. Snowden, Vice President and General
Counsel, Wells Fargo Realty Advisors.
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California real estate lenders are divided into two classes by article
XX, section 22 of the California Constitution.1 One class consists of
lenders that are exempt from the general usury laws, such as banks,
personal property brokers, and industrial loan companies. The other
class consists of lenders that are subject to the usury laws, such as mort-
gage bankers and real estate investment trusts. Those designated as
exempt lenders may lend funds in any amount and at whatever interest
rate the legislature specifically allows. The nonexempt lenders,
however, are limited to a ten percent return on money lent. Recently,
as a result of the rapid rise in interest rates and the corresponding rise
in the cost of money to all lenders, the nonexempt lenders have
frequently been forced to choose between declining to make a given
1. Adopted in 1934, article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution pro-
vides:
The rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
things in action, or on accounts after demand or judgment rendered in any
court of the State, shall be 7 percent per annum but it shall be competent for
the parties to any loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in action
to contract in writing for a rate of interest not exceeding 10 percent per an-
num.
No person, association, copartnership or corporation shall by charging any
fee, bonus, commission, discount or other compensation receive from a bor-
rower more than 10 percent per annum upon any loan or forbearance of any
money, goods or things in action.
However, none of the above restrictions shall apply to any building and loan
association as defined in and which is operated under that certain act known
as the "Building and Loan Association Act," approved May 5, 1931, as
amended, or to any corporation incorporated in the manner prescribed in and
operating under that certain act entitled "An act defining industrial loan com-
panies, providing for their incorporation, powers and supervision," approved
May 18, 1917, as amended, or any corporation incorporated in the manner pre-
scribed in and operating under that certain act entitled "An act defining credit
unions, providing for their incorporation, powers, management and supervi-
sion," approved March 31, 1927, as amended, or any duly licensed pawnbroker
or personal property broker, or any bank as defined in and operating under
that certain act known as the "Bank Act," approved March 1, 1909, as
amended, or any bank created and operating under and pursuant to any laws
of this State or of the United States of America or any nonprofit cooperative
association organized under Chapter 4 of Division VI of the Agricultural Code
in loaning or advancing money in connection with any activity mentioned in
said title or any corporation, association, syndicate, joint stock company, or
partnership engaged exclusively in the business of marketing agricultural, horti-
cultural, viticultural, dairy, livestock, poultry and bee products on a coopera-
tive nonprofit basis in loaning or advancing money to the members thereof or
in connection with any such business or any corporation securing money or
credit from any Federal intermediate credit bank, organized and existing pur-
suant to the provisions of an act of Congress entitled "Agricultural Credits Act
of 1923," as amended, in loaning or advancing credit so secured, nor shall any
such charge of any said exempted classes of persons be considered in any ac-
tion or for any purpose as increasing or affecting or as connected with the rate
of interest hereinbefore fixed. The Legislature may from time to time pre-
scribe the maximum rate per annum of, or provide for the supervision, or the
filing of a schedule of, or in any manner fix, regulate or limit, the fees, bonus,
commissions, discounts or other compensation which all or any of the said ex-
empted classes of persons may charge or receive from a borrower in connection
with any loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in action.
The provisions of this section shall supersede all provisions of this Constitu-
tion and laws enacted thereunder in conflict therewith.
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loan in California and making the loan where the amount of interest
that may be charged is very nearly the cost of funds to the lender.'
To alleviate this financially undesirable situation, the California
Mortgage Bankers Association successfully supported, in the 1973-74
Regular Session of the California Legislature, a bill3 which created a
mortgage banking subclass of exempt industrial loan companies. 4 The
new law, which became effective on January 1, 1974, amended the
Financial Code to provide that corporate lenders 5 who meet certain re-
quirements 6 may be licensed as industrial loan companies and make
"mortgage banking loans." Although permitted to capture more inter-
est than otherwise allowed under the usury laws, mortgage banking
loans are still limited in the amount of interest that can be charged.
They are also limited as to the minimum amount of the loan, the parties
to whom the loan can be made, and the type of security that may be
taken. Two additional restrictions on mortgage banking loans are the
prohibitions against assignment for the first 90 days after their execu-
tion and the requirement that even after assignment, the original
lender must service the loan. In the course of this article, each of these
limitations is discussed in detail. The discussion initially views the na-
ture of the mortgage banker-industrial loan company (hereinafter
referred to as the mortgage banker-ILC) created by the new law; it
then moves to questions regarding the constitutionality of its provisions,
with specific focus on questions of equal protection and legislative
authority under the California Constitution.
NATURE OF THE MORTGAGE BANKER-ILC
A. Forming a Mortgage Banker-ILC
The formation of a mortgage banker-ILC requires, inter alia, the
creation of a California corporation with a minimum capital stock of
2. To fund the commitments they have issued, many lenders raise money through
the sale of commercial paper, the public sale of debentures, or private debt issues. The
rates that lenders pay for these funds are termed the cost of funds.
3. S.B. 321, CAL. STATs. 1973, c. 1150, §3. In 1970 the nonexempt lenders
placed on the ballot a constitutional amendment which would have exempted commercial
loans over $100,000 from the overall ten percent usury limitation. Assembly Constitu-
tional Amendment 50, 1970 Regular Session. This measure was defeated. Proposition
10, General Election, November 3, 1970. In 1972 the California Mortgage Bankers As-
sociation supported a bill which would have expanded the industrial loan company classi-
fication to include a wide variety of commercial real estate lenders now in the nonex-
empt category. S.B. 1026, 1972 Regular Session. This bill passed in the Senate, but
was defeated in the Assembly. Senate Final History, FINAL CALENDAR OF LEGIsLATIvE
BusiNEss, 1972 Regular Session, at 314. For a discussion of mortgage banking and
mortgage bankers see R. PEAsE & L. KEawoop, MORTGAGE BANING (1965).
4. CAL. FIN. CODE §19102.
5. CAL. FIN. CODE §18003.2.
6. See text accompanying notes 7-15 infra.
7. CAL. FIN. CODE §18003.2. This requirement excludes by definition the real
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$100,000,8 and compliance with the provisions of the Industrial Loan
Law.' The first set of requirements under the Industrial Loan Law
relates to the corporate form. Articles, by-laws, a certificate of name
reservation, evidence of capitalization, and a surety bond in the amount
of $1,000 must be presented to the Secretary of State.10 The articles
must contain reference to the fact that the company is formed as a
mortgage banker under division 7 of the California Financial Code."1
An application to engage in the industrial loan business as a mort-
gage banker must also be filed with the Department of Corporations."2
The Department of Corporations suggests that this application be sub-
mitted to its office before filing the articles of incorporation with the
Secretary of State, in order to avoid needless filing if the application
is not approved. 13 The application requirements relate to the need for
biographical information about the persons who will be involved in the
company. An individual who is an incorporator, officer, director,
member of management, or proposed shareholder of the company must
provide information concerning his occupation and business affiliations,
his interests in any financial institutions, and a description of facts
relating to any bankruptcies, liquidations, or other such proceedings in
which he has been involved. Such person must also provide a full
record of his criminal arrests. Finally, a detailed explanation must be
provided of any affiliation between the proposed company and any of
the above classes of persons or companies.' 4
The remaining information required in the application process
relates to the nature of the company itself. The application requires
information concerning the proposed capital structure, a complete
schedule of salaries to be paid, and a detailed narrative statement of
the company's proposed plan of business. Also required is an
estimate, for each of the first three years of operation, of the number
of employees that will be required to conduct the business of the
estate investment trust (which is in legal form an unincorporated "Massachusetts busi-
ness trust"), whose purpose is to provide a means by which the investing public can par-
ticipate in real estate investments without the large scale capital commitments generally
required of corporations. Aldrich, Real Estate Investment Trusts: An Overview, 27Bus. LAW. 1165 (1972). See also Reid, Real Estate Investment Trusts Must Follow
Strict Rules to Achieve Tax Benefits, 2 TAX'N FOR Acc'Ts 42 (1973).
8. CAT_ FiN. CODE §18203.7.
9. CAL. FIN. CODE div. 7 (commencing with §18000).
10. CAL. FIN. CODE §18200.4.
11. CAi. FIN. CODE §18201. Upon request, the California Mortgage Bankers As-
sociation will furnish model articles and by-laws to its members for no charge, and to
nonmembers for a charge of $4.00.
12. Department of Corporations, State of California, Form ILL No. 435 (10-73).
13. Interview with Mr. Richard M. Mwakami, Special Administrator for the De-
partment of Corporations, Los Angeles, Cal., Oct. 10, 1973 [hereinafter cited as
Mwakamil.
14. Department of Corporations, State of California, Form ILL No. 435 (10-73),
Items 2(a)-(f).
4
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proposed company and an estimate of the number and amounts of loans
to be made and contracts or other receivables to be purchased. In
addition, statements of estimated income and expenses for each of the
first three years of operation, accompanied by a projected statement
of financial condition as of the end of each of those years of operation,
must be furnished.' 5
Following completion of the application materials and their sub-
mission to and review by the Commissioner's office, the Commissioner
issues an "Approval to Form" order.1 6  Over the course of the
following month, the corporation is formed and the Commissioner's
office continues to review the application. During the formation period
requests are generally made by the Commissioner's staff for further in-
formation. A "Certificate to Transact Business" is issued only after
the Commissioner's office receives evidence of incorporation and cap-
italization, certified copies of the articles and by-laws, and all other
required information. 7  The Commissioner's office has indicated that
the time normally required between the first filing and the issuance of
the "Certificate to Transact Business" is approximately 45 days. 8
The initial determination to be made in forming the mortgage bank-
er-ILC is whether the lender should merely amend its articles of
incorporation to expressly state that it is subject to the Industrial Loan
Law, 9 or whether a new entity should be created. There are a
number of reasons why lenders may wish to incorporate a subsidiary
rather than amend their articles of incorporation. First, the business
of the mortgage banker-ILC is specifically limited to the making of
mortgage banking loans-loans made to corporations or partnerships
in amounts of $100,000 or more, secured only by real property and
fixtures.2 0  Business lenders that are not similarly restricted and make
unsecured loans or secured loans in amounts less than $100,000 may
desire not to forego the ability to make such loans. Furthermore,
where the interest rate on a particular loan is less than the ten percent
usury limitation, a lender may wish to reserve his ability to participate
out part of the loan immediately after its making. The 90-day pass-
through provision, 2' however, would preclude the assignment or trans-
fer of such a loan for 90 days after its execution. A third reason stems
from the general requirements of the Industrial Loan Law. As pre-
15. Id. Items 3(a)-(i).
16. Mwakami, supra note 13.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. CAL. FIN. CODE §18202.
20. CAL. FN. CODE § 19102.
21. CAL. FIN. CODE §19130.
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viously noted, the mortgage banker-ILC must be a corporation organ-
ized under the Industrial Loan Law. The industrial loan company is
a special type of corporation, intentionally surrounded with safeguards
not required of corporations in general.2 2  For example, a lender may
be unwilling to publicize his complete financial position or may wish
to avoid the expense of having his report certified.23
B. Regulation Under the Industrial Loan Law
The mortgage banker-ILC is subject to the continuing supervision
and regulatory authority of the Corporations Commissioner and the
specific regulations of the Industrial Loan Law.24  Among the
regulatory requirements set forth in the Industrial Loan Law and
elaborated upon in the regulations of the Corporations Commissioner
are the following: The company must keep records in California and
preserve them for at least two years;25 it must file audit reports and
certified financial statements on or before March 15 of each year;2"
and each year the company must publish a condensed statement of its
financial condition in a newspaper of general circulation in the town
or city of its principal place of business. 27  Furthermore, an industrial
loan company may conduct its business at locations where other
businesses are operated only if it is authorized to do so by the
Corporations Commissioner. 2
The Industrial Loan Law also gives the Commissioner broad inves-
tigatory powers. In connection with the application to engage in the
industrial loan business as a mortgage banker, he may conduct any in-
vestigation he feels is necessary," including investigations of the fi-
nancial experience, character, and general fitness of the officers and
directors. 30  He may also require that the industrial loan company
establish and maintain reasonable reserves" and furnish financial
22. In re Peoples Fin. & Thrift Co. of San Diego, 61 Cal. App. 2d 11, 15, 141
P.2d 742, 744 (1943). These safeguards were provided "for the purpose of protecting
the interests not only of creditors, but also of shareholders and all others interested in
or affected by the business of such a corporation." Id.
23. See text accompanying notes 24-27 infra.
24. CAL. FIN. CODE §§18400, 18800 et seq., 19131. Because the mortgage banker-
ILC neither accepts deposits from the public nor makes consumer loans, the scope of
regulation will probably not be as extensive as that imposed upon industrial loan com-
panies generally. Mivakami, supra note 13.
25. CAL. FIN. CODE §18609.
26. CAL. FIN. -CODE §18610.
27. CAL. FIN. CODE §18610.5.
28. CAL. FIN. CODE §18622. Before granting such' authority, the Commissioner
must be satisfied that to do so would not facilitate evasions of the Industrial Loan Law.
Id.
29. CAL. FIN. CODE §§18200.2, 18200.3, 18802.
30. CAL. F N. CODE §§18200.2, 18200.3, 18802.
31. CAL. FIN. CODE §18616.
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information on any affiliates.32  Moreover, the Commissioner may
conduct extra examinations or investigations of a company and perform
any necessary services in connection with its affairs whenever the
company's condition renders such extraordinary attention necessary or
expedient."3  Additionally, the Commissioner may take possession of
the property and the business until the company resumes compliance
or is liquidated whenever it appears that the capital of the company
is impaired, the articles of incorporation have ,been violated, the busi-
ness is being conducted in an unsafe or unauthorized manner, the com-
pany has neglected or refused to observe a commissioner's order, or
that an officer of the company refuses to be examined upon matters
relating to company business.34 If -the Commissioner does take posses-
sion of an industrial loan company, he has broad powers to take what-
ever steps he deems necessary either to conserve or to liquidate it.3"
C. Making Mortgage Banking Loans
The new legislation creating the mortgage banker-ILC limits its
business activities to the making of mortgage banking loans,36 which
are, by definition, made only to corporations or partnerships.3 Osten-
sibly, the new legislation would restrict the making of such loans to
actual corporations or partnerships.3 8 Consequently, should a mort-
gage banker-ILC intentionally or mistakenly loan funds to a
"dummy" corporation or partnership formed solely to satisfy the con-
dition for receiving the loan, the mortgage banker-ILC could be
subjected to penalties under the usury laws. It is not clear, however,
whether a California court would actually pierce a partnership or
corporate facade in this situation.39
In New York a purely formalistic approach has been adopted. If
a corporation has been formed, has executed the loan documents, and
has received the loan proceeds, the court will inquire no further.41
32. CAL. FIN. CODE §18610(g).
33. CAL. FIN. CODE §18807.
34. CAL. FIN. CODE §§18818, 18819. See also CAL. FIN. CODE §§18820, 18821,
18824.
35. CAL. FIN. CODE §18819.
36. CAL. FIN. CODE §18003.2.
37. CAL. FIN. CODE §19102.
38. Id.
39. Unlike several other states, California does not have a usury exemption for
loans to a corporation or partnership and hence has never had occasion to decide the
question. See generally Hershman, Usury and The Tight Mortgage Market, 22 Bus.
LAw. 333 (1967).
40. Jenkins v. Mogse, 254 N.Y. 319, 321, 172 N.E. 521, 523 (1939). In this case
a borrower, as a condition to his receipt of the loan free from the interest limitations
imposed by the New York usury law, was required to organize a corporation to receive
the loan and assume the interest obligation. Subsequent to the foreclosure of the loan,
with title still in the corporation, the borrower sought to avoid the mortgage on the
grounds that the loan was usurious. The New York Court of Appeals upheld
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Thus, courts adhering to the New York rule find irrelevant the fact that
the corporation may be a "dummy" formed at the request of the lender
as a condition to receiving the loan free of the limitations imposed by
the usury laws. The competing view is that which has been adopted
in New Jersey, where the courts will pierce the facade on equitable
grounds, treating the issue as one of whether the corporation is
genuine.41 Presumably these same approaches would be applied in
cases involving loans to partnerships.
For a number of reasons, it seems probable that California would
adopt New York's formalistic approach. First, California does not have
a strong public policy against usury. This is evidenced by court
holdings that usury is never presumed42 and that the party asserting
it assumes the burden of proving that it exists. 43  Secondly, the
involvement of the Corporations Commissioner in regulating the
activities of industrial loan companies aids in preventing abuses and
thus reduces 'the need for the courts to assume a supervisorial role.44
Additionally, the requirement that the loans be at least $100,000 in
principal amount suggests that the parties would be sophisticated in
lending matters and hence unneedful of protective supervision.
However, since the particular appellation given to usurious payments
is immaterial, 45 pro forma compliance with the $100,000 minimum will
not replace actual compliance. Though the California courts have held
that loans which are not usurious at their inception are not made
usurious by subsequent transactions,46 they will consider the sub-
the validity of the loan. The court determined that the usury law limitations
apply only with regard to the agreed party to the loan. If a borrower wishes to avoid
the protection provided by the usury laws by availing himself of the "rights the law ac-
cords to those who do business in corporate form," he is free to do so without prejudice
to the lender, notwithstanding the fact that the corporation was wholly owned and or-
ganized to receive the loan funds and obligations. Id. Cf. Leader v. Dinkier Manage-
ment Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 393, 230 N.E.2d 120, 283 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1967), wherein the
court narrowed Jenkins by. requiring a showing of a "business purpose" in the organiza-
tion of the recipient corporation. See also Hoffman v. Lee Nashem Motors, Inc., 20
N.Y.2d 513, 231 N.E.2d 765, 285 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1967).
41. In re Greenberg, 21 N.J. 213, 121 A.2d 520 (1956); Lesser v. Strubbe, 56 N.J.
Super. 274, 152 A.2d 409 (1959). The courts in these cases took a position contrary
to that expressed by the New York Court of Appeals, holding that the public policy
against usury cannot be disregarded by making use of the "corporate cloak." The courts
indicated that the application of the exemption from usury limitations was restricted to
bona fide corporations in order "that sympathetic sweep might be given to the State's
policy against usury." In re Greenberg, 21 N.J. at 220, 121 A.2d at 524. See also
Holland v. Gross, 89 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1956); Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 920 (1956); Annot.,
74 A.L.R. 205 (1930).
42. Sandell, Inc. v. Bailey, 212 Cal. App. 2d 920, 931-32, 28 Cal. Rptr. 413, 420(1963); Giorgi v. Conradi, 199 Cal. App. 2d 82, 85, 18 Cal. Rptr. 588, 590 (1962).
43. See cases cited note 42 supra. See also Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227
Cal. App. 2d 11, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964).
44. See text accompanying notes 24-35 supra.
45. Golden State Lanes v. Fox, 232 Cal. App. 2d 135, 42 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1965).
46. Thomas v. Hunt Mfg. Corp., 42 Cal. 2d 724, 269 P.2d 12 (1954); Goldenzwig
v. Shaddock, 31 Cal. App. 2d 719, 88 P.2d 933 (1939).
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sequent acts of the parties to determine if the consideration flowing
from the borrower to the lender actually exceeds the limitations of the
usury laws.47  Therefore, transactions providing for an immediate re-
payment of a substantial amount of the principal should be avoided.
A suitable benchmark to use for repayment of any principal under a
mortgage banking loan would be the 90-day period in which the mort-
gage banker-ILC must hold the loan prior to any transfer or assign-
ment;48 foregoing repayment of principal until the expiration of such
period should avoid the appearance of a sham transaction.
Mortgage banking loans are also limited by the type of security which
may be utilized. As originally proposed, the legislation which created
the mortgage banker-TLC required that the loan be secured directly
or collaterally by a lien on real property. 49 However, the California
Mortgage Bankers Association was concerned that this restriction
would be impractical since large numbers of lenders are involved in
motel, shopping center, and other forms of building financing in which
fixtures and furniture represent a significant portion of the total value
of the property.50 Apparently because of this concern, the language
relating to furniture and fixtures was added.51
One final limitation is that no industrial loan company may contract
for or receive charges at a rate exceeding 1.5 percent per month on
the unpaid principal balance.52 Charges are defined in the California
Financial Code to include
[t]he aggregate interest, fees, bonuses, commissions, brokerage,
discounts, expenses, and other forms of costs charged, contracted
for, or received by an industrial loan company or any other person
in connection with the investigating, arranging, negotiating, procur-
ing, guaranteeing, making, servicing, collecting, or enforcing of a
loan, or for forbearance of money, credit, goods, things in action,
or any other service or services rendered.5 3
This broad definition probably includes points, stand-by or commitment
fees, appraisal fees, and escrow fees.54  However, because the
definition of "charges" focuses on fees for services or amounts paid as
47. Thomas v. Hunt Mfg. Corp., 42 Cal. 2d 724, 269 P.2d 12 (1954).
48. CAL. FN. CODE §19130.
49. S.B. 321, 1973-74 Regular Session, as introduced, Feb. 26, 1973.
50. Letter from James B. Werson, Counsel for the California Mortgage Bankers
Association, to the members of the California Mortgage Bankers Association, 1974, on
file at the Pacific Law Journal [hereinafter cited as Werson].
51. S.B. 321, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended, Sept. 10, 1973.
52. CAL. FIN. CODE §18655.1.
53. CAL. FIN. CODE §18651.
54. Sections 18660.1 and 18660.5 of the Financial Code effectively exclude ap-
praisal and escrow fees from the maximum charge computations. However, Financial
Code Section 18669.2 exempts the mortgage banker-ILC from those sections.
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compensation for the loan, prepayment penalties probably would not
be considered a charge -and would be allowed irrespective of the 18
percent per annum limitation. Finally, because the determination of
whether a loan is usurious is based upon consideration of the total
charges collected over the life of the loan,55 disproportionately high
charges may be collected at the front end of the loan and still remain
within the statutory limitation, so long as the total amount collected
does not exceed an amount equal to 18 percent per annum over the
life of the loan.
THE PASS-THROUGH PROVISION
A. Application of the Pass-Through
The pass-through provision of the new law, Financial Code Section
19130, provides that no mortgage banking loan shall be assigned or
otherwise transferred within 90 days after the date of execution, but
thereafter a mortgage banking loan may be assigned to a third party,
whether or not that party is licensed under the Industrial Loan
Law. The sole prerequisite to the operation of this provision is that
the servicing of the loan always be performed by a mortgage banker-
ILC.56 If this condition is met, the rights of the exempt lender also
accrue to the assignee or transferee of the loan." The transfer or
assignment does not, however, affect the regulatory powers of the
Commissioner over the mortgage banker-ILC servicing the loan."
Additionally, the pass-through provision allows the mortgage banker-
ILC to agree, prior to making the loan, to assign or otherwise transfer
it. Finally, Financial Code Section 19102 provides that for purposes
of the pass-through provision, the date of the execution of the first note
or other agreements is deemed to be the date of the execution of the
loan.
In essence, these provisions allow the mortgage banker-ILC to
arrange for project financing, carry the interest in the loan for 90 days,
and then assign it to another lender, either by some form of partici-
pation or by outright sale and assignment. In these situations, the
mortgage banker-ILC is required only to continue to service the loan
by collecting the payments due and performing the related bookkeep-
ing and accounting functions.59 One potential application of the pass-
55. Brown v. Cardoza, 67 Cal. App. 2d 187, 192, 153 P.2d 767, 769-70 (1944).
See also French v. Mortgage Guarantee Co., 16 Cal. 2d 26, 104 P.2d 655 (1949).
56. CAL. FIN. CODE §19130.
57. Id.
58. CAL. FIN. CODE §19131.
59. CAL. FIN. CODE §§19103, 19130.
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through provision is illustrated in this situation: The mortgage banker-
ILC makes the loan, fully or partially disburses the proceeds to the
borrower within the 90-day warehousing period, and then, 91 days
after the closing date, assigns or participates out an interest in the loan.
For example, in the typical construction financing situation, a loan is
made prior to the commencement of actual construction. The lender
will usually disburse the loan funds at various stages as the work
progresses. If the lender is a mortgage banker-ILC, he may
subsequently choose to assign or participate out his interest in the loan
and allow the remainder of the disbursement to be made by the
assignee or transferee. In this situation, the transaction would appear
to be a bona fide loan from the mortgage banker-ILC to the borrower.
A second set of circumstances, however, may place the mortgage
banker-ILC in the position of a mere conduit. In this example, the mort-
gage banker-ILC signs a commitment letter with the borrower, which
begins the running of the 90-day warehousing period. 60 Subsequently,
toward the end of the 90-day period, the loan is actually executed, but
still no funds are disbursed. Finally, after the expiration of the 90-day
period, the loan is assigned or transferred and the assignee or
tranferee disburses the proceeds to the borrower. Since the new
legislation contemplates the actual making of the loan by the mortgage
banker-ILC, avoiding the consequences for violations of the usury laws
may require that the lender forego use of the commitment letter and
make at least a partial disbursement of the loan proceeds himself."x
B. Validity of the Pass-Through Loan
The pass-through provision is subject to challenge on the basis that
it is offensive to California's usury policy. Since it is California's policy
to divide lenders into exempt and nonexempt classes, it can be argued
that the pass-through provision allows the mortgage banker-ILC to be
used for the procurement of usurious returns for nonexempt lenders.
62
Several considerations seem to be involved in this matter.
60. For the purposes of the 90-day restriction, the date of execution of an "other
agreement" is deemed to be the date of execution of the loan and any advances thereun-
der. CAL. FIN. CODE §19102. The California Mortgage Bankers Association has indi-
cated that the term "other agreement" was intended to include a commitment letter,
Werson, supra note 50, at 11, 14, although the code is not explicit on this point.
61. See note 62 infra.
62. The risks of taking part in a pass-through transaction, if it is found to be in-
valid, are twofold. For the nonexempt assignee, the transaction may be held usurious.
Two separate penalties are provided for usury in California. In cases where a civil ac-
tion is brought on the usurious transaction, the borrower may recover up to three times
the amount of usurious interest he had to pay, provided the action is brought within one
year of the usurious payment. CAL. CIV. CODE §1916-3(a). Furthermore, any person
who contracts for or receives a usurious rate of interest is guilty of loan sharking, a
felony, and may be punished by up to five years in the state prison or not more than
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 6
The first consideration relates directly to the strength of the policy
against usury in California. Although the California courts have rec-
ognized the necessity for the law to protect borrowers from the
oppression of lenders 3 and "the needy from the greed of the
rapacious," 64 they have also established that the usury law was designed
to be used as a shield and not as a sword and that transactions are to
be presumed fair, regular, and legal.65 The considerations typically
invoked to rebut the presumption of fairness would not appear to apply
in transactions involving businessmen dealing at arm's length. Again,
pass-through provision loans may be made only to corporations and
partnerships in amounts of $100,000 or more, and the entire lending
relationship-the execution, assignment, and ongoing collection and
servicing of the loan-is subject to the control and supervision of the
Corporations Commissioner. Thus the California policy against
overreaching lenders is preserved in the case of pass-through loans,
both by an assurance of the financial sophistication of the parties
involved, and by the constant presence of supervision through the
regulations of the Corporations Commissioner.
A second consideration also militates in favor of the validity of the
pass-through loan. There are a number of cases which have held that
a loan not usurious at its inception remains nonusurious over its life,
even though sums subsequently paid to the obligee as bonuses, when
coupled with the interest paid, are in excess of the allowable interest
rate.66 Therefore, if the original lender is a mortgage banker-ILC, the
loan will not become usurious by reason of assignment in whole or
part to a nonexempt entity.
Finally, a major consideration in determining the validity of the pass-
through provisions may be whether there exists a bona fide three-party
one year in the county jail. CAL. CIV. CODE §1916-3(b). For the mortgage banker-
ILC there exists the possibility of liability for the usurious returns received by the non-
exempt lender. This is so despite the fact that the mortgage banker-ILC is an exempt
lender under the new legislation. Inasmuch as California courts have held that usury
is a wholly statutory device and that liability can be imposed only by the express lan-
guage of the usury statute, an agent of a lender who makes a usurious loan is not liable
with the principal since the statute does not impose liability on a creditor's agent, abet-
tor, or co-conspirator. Penziner v. West American Fin. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 160, 74 P.2d
252 (1937); Clarke v. Horany, 212 Cal. App. 2d 307, 27 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1963). How-
ever, liability is imposed on a partner of the individual making the loan, whether or not
the partner plays an active role in making it. Calimpco v. Warden, 100 Cal. App. 2d
429, 224 P.2d 421 (1950). If the mortgage banker-ILC were found to be a partner orjoint venturer with a particular assignee-for example, where it provided a continuing
flow of loan transactions for the assignee-the mortgage banker-ILC might be held li.
able and subject to the usury penalties.
63. Eaker v. Bryant, 24 Cal. App. 87, 140 P. 310 (1914).
64. In re Washer, 78 Cal. App. 759, 248 P. 1068 (1926).
65. Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 200 Cal. 609, 254 P. 956 (1927); Giorgi
v. Conradi, 199 Cal. App. 2d 82, 18 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1962).
66. See, e.g., Goldenzwig v. Shaddock, 31 Cal. App. 2d 719, 88 P.2d 933 (1939).
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transaction between a borrower, a mortgage banker-ILC, and its
assignee. This is suggested in an opinion of the California Attorney
General67 which dealt with the question whether, when an insured
financed his annual premium with a commerical bank, and the bank
then provided the premium note and an assignment of the chose to the
insurer, the insurer could lawfully receive interest in excess of that
allowed by article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution. The
Attorney General indicated that if the relationship between the bank,
the insured, and the insurer was substantively more than a transaction
directly between the insurer and insured, the assignment would not
make the transaction usurious. Extending this logic to the pass-
through situation, it would seem that if due regard is had for maintain-
ing a bona fide three-party transaction between the mortgage banker-
ILC, the borrower, and the assignee, the transaction will not be held
usurious.
Although the California courts have indicated that form is sub-
ordinate to substance in determining the applicability of usury laws,
68
they have not addressed the specific question of the extent to which
an exempt lender may, consistent with the usury laws, act as a conduit
for otherwise usurious loans. A Florida court spoke to this matter in
Coral Gables First National Bank v. Constructors of Florida,69 which
dealt with a three-party loan transaction involving a national bank, a
state bank, and a borrower. In Coral Gables the state bank made an
obviously usurious loan, 0 using the national bank as a conduit.'
Specifically, the national bank executed the loan and disbursed the loan
proceeds directly to the borrower.72 Shortly thereafter, the state bank
became a participant in the loan73 by allowing its account to be debited
by the national bank for 93 percent of the funds actually disbursed
under the loan.74  The apparent purpose was to allow the state bank
to avoid the state usury penalties and subject itself only to the possibility
of penalties under the less severe federal law.7 5 In determining the
appropriate penalties, however, the court treated the state bank as if
it had made 93 percent of the loan directly to the borrower.76  The
67. 50 OPS. Ar'Y GEN. 110 (1967).
68. Golden State Lanes v. Fox, 232 Cal. App. 2d 135, 42 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1965);
Giorgi v. Conradi, 199 Cal. App. 2d 82, 85, 18 Cal. Rptr. 588, 590 (1962).
69. 119 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1960).
70. Id. at 746.
71. Id. at 745, 748.
72. Id. at 745.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 747.
75. Id. at 746.
76. Id. at 748.
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use of a conduit was thus ineffective in avoiding application of the state
usury law penalties. 77
The logic of Coral Gables and the opinion of the California Attorney
General suggest certain arguments regarding the validity of the pass-
through loan. The existence of a bona fide three-party transaction, in
which all parties play some material role, is apparently indispensable.
In determining whether the mortgage banker-ILC performs such a
material role when the loan is assigned to a nonexempt lender, the ex-
tent of actual economic risk borne ,by the mortgage banker-ILC may
be the crucial factor. When all of the proceeds are disbursed by the
mortgage banker-ILC at the beginning of the 90-day warehousing
period, and on the 91st day the loan is assigned or a participation in-
terest is sold to a nonexempt lender, the entire risk of economic set-
back with regard to the loan is borne by the mortgage banker-ILC for
a full three month period. In this instance, therefore, there is little
substance to the claim that the lender acts only in the capacity of a con-
duit with respect to the transaction between the borrower and the
assignee or transferee of the loan. In general, both the amount of
funds actually disbursed by the mortgage banker-ILC and the period
of time separating such disbursement from the assignment of the loan
will influence the degree of economic risk. As the economic risk
changes, so does the vulnerability of the mortgage banker-ILC to the
charge that its participation is only pro forma, in the nature of a conduit.
In the construction financing example discussed above, the proceeds
disbursed in the first installments are subject to the full economic risks
of the 90-day warehousing period even though the full amount of the
proceeds is not.78 On the other hand, when the mortgage banker-
ILC issues a commitment letter,79 waits 89 days before funding the
loan, and assigns the loan only two days later, the risk assumed by the
mortgage banker-ILC is minimal, and its pro forma compliance with
the exemption allowance clearly invites the charge that it has acted
solely as a conduit and thus in violation of the state usury policy. 0
Thus, while most transactions under the pass-through provision are
77. See Lowell, A Current Analysis of the Usury Laws: A National View, 8 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 193, 224-28 (1971).
78. One variation would be for the mortgage banker-ILC to assign the loan at the
end of the 90-day period, with an agreement with the assignee whereby the mortgage
banker makes all the advances and is reimbursed. See Werson, supra note 50, at 14.
79. See note 60 supra.
80. Additionally, in such transactions there is a substantial question whether a loan
is executed at all when a commitment letter is issued. A commitment letter is generally
a one-sided assumption of duties by the lender in the nature of a binding option, under
which the lender commits to provide funding in the future, subject to a number of condi-
tions. It is not a contract to loan funds and make obligatory advances and repayment,
and there is generally no assurance that a loan will ever be made.
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probably valid even when a prearranged assignment is involved, the
courts may prohibit the use of the pass-through loan where the
economic risk to the mortgage banker-ILC is de minimus; in such cases
they would find that there is no bona fide loan between the mortgage
banker-ILC and the borrower.
Tim CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MORTGAGE
BANKER-ILC AS AN EXEMPT LENDER
The constitutionality of the legislature's designation of the mortgage
banker-ILC as an exempt lender is likely to be challenged on two
grounds. First, it can be argued that the legislature, in creating aimort-
gage banker subclass of industrial loan companies, has exceeded the
authority granted by article XX, section 22 of the California Constitu-
tion, which exempts certain lenders from usury limitations. Secondly,
it may be argued that the legislation creating the mortgage banker-ILC
is violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
and California's constitutional provisions prohibiting discriminatory
legislation. 81
A. Constitutional Authority to Create the Mortgage Banker-ILC
Article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the 1934 constitutional amendment) was proposed by the
legislature and subsequently ratified by the people in order to cure the
"inflexible, inadequate and unworkable" provisions of the Usury Law"
and to grant the legislature the power to attack specific lending
problems.8 3 The 1934 constitutional amendment set the maximum in-
terest rate at ten percent and prohibited the lender from increasing his
compensation over the ten percent limit by charging a fee, bonus, or other
commission. It also established a class of lenders not subject to the
overall interest limitation, for which the legislature could "prescribe the
maximum rate per annum of, or provide for the supervision, or the fil-
ing of a schedule of, or in any manner fix, regulate or limit, the fee,
bonus, commissions, discounts, or other compensations. . . ." Finally,
the 1934 constitutional amendment superseded all other constitutional
provisions or laws which conflicted with it.84
81. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§11, 21.
82. Carter v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 579, 203 P.2d 758, 768 (1949).
83. Id.
84. A question arose as to the effect of the amendment upon the Usury Law of
1918. The California Supreme Court held that insofar as the constitutional amendment
was inconsistent with the Usury Law, the former would be controlling; but where not
inconsistent, the Usury Law would still be effective. French v. Mortgage Guarantee
Co., 16 Cal. 2d 26, 104 P.2d 665 (1949).
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One of the entities specifically exempted by the 1934 constitutional
amendment is the industrial loan company-" The following analysis
of the constitutionality of the mortgage banker-ILC argues that the
mortgage banker-ILC is a legitimate subclass of the industrial loan
company and thus a valid creation under the 1934 constitutional
amendment. Moreover, it is contended that the evolution of specific
safeguards since 1934 has rendered the criticisms directed against the
early industrial loan company inapposite to the new mortgage banker-
ILC.
1. Origin of the Industrial Loan Company
The Morris Plan was created to allow the lender a greater return
than that permitted by the usury laws.86 Morris Plan companies began
as corporations designed to operate essentially as banks T  They issued
three types of paper: common stock to their shareholders, interest-
bearing notes to their investors, and "investment certificates" to their
borrowers. It was the fiction of the "sale" of this third type of paper
which made their operations profitable.
A borrower was required to produce two cosigners or guarantors for
the note, agree to pay the allowable rate of interest and the "expenses"
of making the loan, and enter into a contract to purchase investment
certificates in the amount of the loan. The contract generally provided
that the borrower was to purchase the investment certificates on an in-
stallment plan. The certificates were to be deposited with the lender
as collateral for the loan, but they did not bear interest while on de-
posit. Only when the certificates were fully paid did they apply to off-
set the loan. The paid certificates were then cancelled and the note
returned to the borrower.
The result over the term of the loan was an enhanced return. The
installment payments were not applied to reduce the outstanding bal-
ance under the note and therefore the amount of interest due, but went
instead toward the purchase of the investment certificates, and the
Morris Plan company could thus charge the maximum interest on the
full amount of the note during the entire period that funds were
outstanding. Consider, for example, a loan of $1,000 made for one
year. The borrower, as a condition to receiving the loan, purchased
ten $100 investment certificates, the purchase price to be paid in fifty
85. See note 1 supra.
86. REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMr=E FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF
SwuLL LOANS, JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY 1297, 1301 (Reg. Sess. 1935)
[hereinafter cited as ASSEMBLY REPORT].
87. This discussion on the early history of industrial loan companies relies heavily
on Stone, Small Loans in California, 29 CAL. L. REv. 332, 336-50 (1941).
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weekly installments of $20. When the certificates were paid in full,
they could be exchanged for the note. At the end of the 45th week,
the borrower had paid $900 toward the purchase of the certificates,
but was still paying interest on the original $1,000 borrowed.
Morris Plan companies were authorized to operate in California as
industrial loan companies with the passage of the 1917 Industrial Loan
Law.88 The purpose of the Industrial Loan Law was to restrict the
activities of industrial loan companies in California, not to protect
borrowers, but rather to protect shareholders and creditors.8 9 Al-
though the law was thought to create competition for commercial
banks, as had similar statutes in other states, the California law
prohibited the companies from either receiving deposits or issuing
certificates of deposit. 90
The industrial loan company was defined simply as a corporation
which, in the regular course of its business, loaned money and issued
its own choses in action under the provisions of -the Industrial Loan
Law. 1 Such companies were empowered (1) to loan money, on
personal security or otherwise, at six percent per annum; (2) to receive
money in connection with the loan installments on certificates of invest-
ment, provided that the cerificates were issued simultaneously with the
loan; (3) to sell and negotiate choses in action for payments of money, so
long as the choses were in a form approved by the Commissioner;
and (4) to charge, in addition to interest, one dollar for every fifty
loaned, as expenses for making the loan.92 Loan maturities were
restricted to one year, and even though no limit was placed on the size
of any one loan, no borrower could be obligated for more than two per-
cent of the amount of the capital and surplus of the company.93
Various other limitations were incorporated into the California law.
As initially enacted, the Industrial Loan Law did not directly regulate
day-to-day activities, but it did grant the California Corporations
Commissioner broad authority to supervise industrial loan company
activities. The Commissioner was empowered to issue an order
directing the discontinuance of any practice which, in his opinion, was
being conducted in an "unsafe or injurious manner."94  Furthermore,
the Commissioner could order the company to discontinue any
practice not in compliance with the company's articles and to cure any
88. CAL. FIN. CODE div. 7 (commencing with §18000), as enacted, CAL. STATS.
1917, c. 522, at 658.
89. Daugherty v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 2d 851, 133 P.2d 827 (1943).
90. CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 522, §5, at 658.
91. Id.
92. CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 522, §4, at 659.
93. CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 522, §5, at 659.
94. CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 522, §11, at 661.
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capital impairment that existed.95 The Industrial Loan Law also
specifically stated that it in no way limited the power of the Commis-
sioner under the Investment Companies Act9 to regulate, at his discre-
tion, the issuance of all choses in action.9 7
The Industrial Loan Law was passed one year before the enactment
of the Usury Law of 1918.98 Although the effect of the Usury Law
upon the interest and charges provisions of the Industrial Loan Law
was never tested, its effect on the analogous interest and charges
provisions of the Personal Property Brokers Act00 was to render them
invalid. e00 In Beneficial Loan Society v. Haight,1'0 the California
Supreme Court held that the Usury Law established the maximum rate
of interest for all loans, whether secured or unsecured, regardless of
the amount or nature of the security. Consequently, the Usury Law
did not permit an arbitrary charge by certain personal property brokers
for a greater amount.
Both the California Attorney General' 02 and an assembly commit-
tee 0 have observed in retrospect that in view of the logic of Haight
and similar cases, the interest and charges provisions of the Industrial
Loan Law probably violated the Usury Law until article XX, section 22
of the California Constitution was ratified in 1934. The third para-
graph of that amendment specifically identifies corporations formed
under the 1917 Industrial Loan Law as exempt lenders.' 0 4
A 1934 industrial loan company was substantially the same institu-
tion as its 1917 ancestor. The power to sell investment certificates, 05
95. Id.
96. CAL. STATS. 1913, c. 353, at 715.
97. CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 522, §10, at 661. In 1933 the Industrial Loan Law was
amended to make the powers of the Commissioner more explicit. All corporate powers
of the industrial loan company, including the power to regulate the amount of interest
and charges to be received from the borrower, were expressly made subject to the super-
vision and control of the Commissioner. He was granted the power to order the com-
pany to suspend payment of all liabilities whenever it appeared necessary for the protec-
tion of the interests of investment certificate holders as well as shareholders, investors,
or other creditors. The Commissioner was also given the authority to prescribe rules
and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the Industrial Loan Law. CAL.
STATS. 1933, c. 132, §4, at 586.
98. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916-1 et seq., as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1919, at lxxxiii.
99. CAr.. FIN. CoDE div. 9 (commencing with §22000), as enacted, CAL. STATS.
1909, c. 634, §1, at 969, found in CAL. STATS. 1907.
100. See 18 CAL. L. REv. 542, 548 (1930).
101. 215 Cal. 506, 11 P.2d 857 (1932).
102. Letter from the Attorney General of California to the Commissioner of Cor-porations, July 15, 1931, cited in Stone, Small Loans in California, 29 CAL. L. REv. 332,
352n.38 (1941).
103. ASsEMBLY REPORT, supra note 86, at 1312.
104. In 1941 the legislature re-enacted the interest and charges provisions of the In-dustrial Loan Law, apparently in order to avoid any uncertainty as to their validity.
CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 1187, at 2945.
105. CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 132, §4, at 584. This power effectively made the allow-
able rate of interest unlimited. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
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to loan money and issue choses in action,08 to take personal property
"or otherwise" as security,'10 7 to deduct interest in advance at six per-
cent per annum,-08 and to charge borrowers "for expenses" in limited
amounts remained available to the 1934 company.109 Additionally, the
Corporations Commissioner retained the extensive regulatory powers
over the industrial loan companies that he had enjoyed with respect to
the 1917 company." 0
2. Constitutional Parallels to the Mortgage Banker-ILC
Because the exempt status of the early industrial loan companies was
specifically bestowed upon them by the 1934 constitutional amend-
ment, the constitutionality of the mortgage banker-ILC's exempt
status may be established by demonstrating that the mortgage banker-
ILC is essentially the same entity as the early industrial loan company.
In this respect, there exist two major distinctions between the mortgage
banker-ILC and the prior industrial loan company. First, the mort-
gage banker-ILC, unlike the early company, is not empowered to
issue investment certificates. Secondly, in contrast to the early in-
dustrial loan company, the mortgage banker-ILC is specifically author-
ized to take real property as security for its loans. It is contended
that these two distinctions would not have precluded the operation of the
mortgage banker-ILC under the 1917 law, and that the mortgage
banker-ILC is thus, like its predecessor, within the constitutional
authority of the 1934 constitutional amendment.
A second argument for the constitutionality of the mortgage banker-
]LC is also presented in a comparative context. Specifically, it is
contended that the public policy under the 1934 constitutional amend-
ment supports the creation of the mortgage banker-ILC and that the
arguments which were leveled against the 1934 industrial loan
company do not attach to the mortgage banker-ILC because of the
particular limitations on industrial loan companies which have devel-
oped since 1934.
The mortgage banker-ILC is within the 1917 Industrial Loan Law
and therefore within the scope of the 1934 constitutional amend-
ment.
The fact that the mortgage banker-ILC cannot issue investment cer-
tificates does not take it outside the framework, of the early Industrial
106. CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 132, §1, at 584.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 132, §4, at 586.
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Loan Law. At the time of the 1934 constitutional amendment, the
industrial loan company was defined as a company which, under the
provisions of the Industrial Loan Law, made loans and issued its own
choses in action.11' There was no specific requirement, however, that
the company either be limited in its issuance of choses to investment
certificates or that it issue investment certificates with every loan.
Rather, the Industrial Loan Law, in separate sections, empowered those
companies licensed under it to "receive and require . . . installments
on its certificates of investment, purchased by the borrower simulta-
neously with the . . . loan transaction . . . ." and "[tio sell or negoti-
ate choses in action for the payment of money at any time, either fixed
or uncertain, and to receive payments therefore in installments or other-
wise, with or without an allowance of interest upon such installments."11 2
It is perhaps indicative of the legislative intent in this area that since
1934 the legislature has provided for the licensing under the Industrial
Loan Law of companies, such as the premium finance agency,"13 which
are not permitted to issue investment certificates.3 4
The mortgage banker-TLC fits within this framework. Though it
may not issue investment certificates, it does make loans and issue its
own "choses in action." 1 5 The choses in action in this case, however,
take the form of commercial paper. Like the investment certificate,
commercial paper is essentially an unsecured note for the payment of
money. There are, to be sure, substantial differences. Commercial
paper is not purchased by the borrower. It is sold either at a discount
or as an interest-bearing note, and payment is not by installments. The
key, however, is that commercial paper is a chose in action and its issu-
ance was sanctioned by the Industrial Loan Law as it existed in 1934.
A second distinction between the 1934 industrial loan company and
the mortgage banker-ILC is that the latter is expressly authorized to
take real property as security for its loans." 6 It is contended that this
distinction goes only to the surface of the legislation which created the
mortgage banker-ILC and its predecessor. In fact, it appears that the
use of real property as security would have been allowed under the In-
dustrial Loan Law operative in 1934. Although the industrial loan
company relied upon personal property, generally in the form of a
pledge of investment certificates as security for its loans, such reliance
111. CAL. STATS. 1917, c. 522, §1, at 658.
112. CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 132, §1, at 584.
113. CAL. FIN. CODE §18900 et seq.
114. CAL. FIN. CODE §18003.1.
115. CAL. FIN. CODE §18405. A chose in action is a right to recover money or
other personal property through a judicial proceeding. CAL. CIV. CODE §953.
116. CAL. FIN. COD §19102.
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was not required. The law empowered the industrial loan company
to loan "on personal security, or otherwise."117  Although the question
was never directly addressed by the California Supreme Court, there is
good reason to believe that the "or otherwise" provision authorized the
use of real property as security.
Specifically, in Budget Finance Plan v. Gamson"8 the California
Supreme Court had at issue the constitutionality of an amendment to the
Personal Property Brokers Act which permitted personal property
brokers to take liens on real property as well as personal property on
loans over $5,000. 19 It was argued that the term "duly licensed
personal property broker," as used in the 1934 constitutional amend-
ment, included only lenders who took liens on personal property as se-
curity; to enlarge that class by allowing real as well as personal property
as security would amount to an amendment of the constitution which
could be accomplished only by a vote of the people. 2 '
The court began its analysis by noting that no definition of a personal
property broker was given in the 1934 constitutional amendment, but
that the term referred to the class of lenders defined in the Personal
Property Brokers Act of 1933.121 This act defined the "personal prop-
erty broker" as one who secured loans "in whole or in part" with rights
in or to personal property. This definition was the same as that which
appeared in the original Personal Property Brokers Act of 1909."2
The court examined the wording of the definition, the circumstances
which existed at the time of its adoption, and the evolution of the
personal property broker as licensed in California, discussing the
various amendments and revisions of the Personal Property Brokers
Act from its inception to the time of this case. The court pointed out
that in 1909 the personal property broker was limited as to the allow-
able interest and charges while other lenders were unregulated. 23  At
the time of the Budget Finance decision they could charge more than
other lenders generally, so long as they complied with the appropriate
licensing and regulatory requirements and were subject to the super-
vision of the Corporations Commissioner.' The court held, after
117. CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 132, §1, at 584 (emphasis added).
118. 34 Cal. 2d 95, 207 P.2d 825 (1949). See also Riebe v. Budget Financial, 264
Cal. App. 2d 576, 70 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1968).
119. CAL. STATS. 1945, c. 1200, at 2321.
120. CAL. CONST. art. XVII-, §2.
121. 34 Cal. 2d at 97-98, 207 P.2d at 826-27.
122. CAL. STATS. 1909, c. 634, §, at 969, found in CAL. STATS. 1907. The defini-
tion remained unchanged at the time of this decision. CAL. STATS. 1939, c. 1044, at
2874; CAL. STATS. 1939, c. 952, at 2667.
123. 34 Cal. 2d at 100, 207 P.2d at 827.
124. Id. See CAL. FIN. CODE §21200, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1939, c. 951, §1,
at 2667.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 6
considering all these factors, that the original definition, which allowed
the taking in whole or in part of personal property security, was
unchanged. The use of "in whole or in part" indicated the legislative
intent to allow other security as well as personal property security.
Therefore, the legislature had the regulatory power in 1945 to reinstate
the right to take liens on real property as security, just as it had the
power in 1939 to prohibit it. 2 '
A similar analysis may be applied to the issue of the constitutionality
of the new mortgage banker-ILC provisions. Just as the language
in the Personal Property Brokers Act was construed in Budget Finance
to include loans secured in part by real property, the power to loan
on "personal security, or otherwise" arguably authorized industrial loan
companies to loan not only on personal property security, but also on
real property-not only in conjunction with personal property, but as the
sole security. Thus it becomes clear that the power of the mortgage
banker-ILC to take liens on real property is not new; rather, unlike
the early Industrial Loan Law, the new legislation merely states such
power expressly.
It may be concluded, then, that neither its inability to issue invest-
ment certificates nor its capacity to take real property as security for
its loans would have prevented the mortgage banker-ILC from operat-
ing as an industrial loan company within the limits of the law in 1934.
Hence, the mortgage banker-ILC is a valid subclass of the industrial
loan company, specifically exempted from usury limitations under the
1934 constitutional amendment.
Public policy considerations which attached to the early industrial
loan company do not apply to the mortgage banker-ILC.
The operation of industrial loan companies was strongly criticized in
a report made in 1935 by the California Assembly Interim Committee
for the Investigation of Small Loans126 (hereinafter referred to as the
Assembly Report), which portrayed the Industrial Loan Law as a mere
circulation system designed to dissemble the actual returns on money
lent. Even then, however, because of the large sums of money invested
in industrial loan companies by 1935, the committee viewed the
abolition of such companies as too harsh, and thus as an undesirable
remedy. 1 7 Although the regulatory framework which existed in 1934
125. 34 Cal. 2d at 101, 207 P.2d at 829.
126. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 86, at 1301. See also Collins, Evasion and
Avoidance of California Usury Laws, 8 LAvw & CONThiMP. PROB. 54 (1941); Stone,
Small Loans in California, 29 CAL. L. REv. 332 (1941); Stone & Thomas, California's
Legislature Faces The Small Loan Problem, 27 CAL. L. REv. 286 (1939).
127. See ASSEMBLY REPoRT, supra note 86, at 1312. In addition, it was believed
that other aspects of the small loan industry were in more urgent need of reform. Id.
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permitted the industrial loan company to receive returns which the
Assembly Report characterized as unjustified and inequitable, the In-
dustrial Loan Law as it now exists and the new provisions relating to
the mortgage banker-ILC protect against such results.
Since the 1934 constitutional amendment, the Industrial Loan Law
has undergone a number of important changes. The general trend has
been toward a more precise definition of the nature of the industrial
loan company business and toward a greater level of regulation, both
by the specific terms of the Industrial Loan Law and by implication
from further grants of authority to the Commissioner. In 1940, in part
"to prohibit devices and subterfuges designed to evade the Act,"' 28 the
legislature undertook a major revision. The capital requirements for
operation were substantially increased and the corporate powers were
altered.129 The Industrial Loan Law, which had provided that indus-
trial loan companies could make loans on "personal security, or other-
wise," was amended to provide that industrial loan companies could
loan money "on personal property security, including the pledge of its
installment investment certificates, or without security other than the
pledge of its installment investment certificates, or on real property
security or loans over three hundred dollars ($300) with or without
the pledge of its installment investment certificates. . . ."130 Addition-
ally, a certificate of investment was to be issued with each loan except
that the issue of installment investment certificates with real estate
loans or loans over $300 was optional with the industrial loan com-
pany.' 3 ' Fees, brokerage, other charges, and conditions for the payment
of attorneys' fees were carefully prescribed.' 32 A limitation on interest,
brokerage, and all other charges by any lender was set at 2.5 percent
per month on unpaid principal balances up to $100, two percent per
month on the portion between $100 and $300, and ten percent per
year on any amount in excess of $300.. 33
In 1951 the legislature enacted provisions dealing with the par value
of shares issued,' the identification of the nature of the company in
the articles, 3 ' and the ability of an industrial loan company to
purchase, sell, or discount secured or unsecured obligations.' 36 The
corporate powers provisions of the Industrial Loan Law were simplified
128. CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 1187, at 2945. See also CAL. STATS. 1940, 1st Ex. Sess.,
c. 34, at 89.
129. See CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 1187, §3, at 2945.
130. CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 1187, §4, at 2946.
131. CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 1187, §4(1), at 2946.
132. CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 1187, §4(3), at 2947.
133. Id.
134. CAL. FIN. CODE §18207.
135. CAL. FIN. CODE §18201.
136. CAL. FIN. CODE §18405.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 6
to state that the company could loan money, secured or unsecured, with
or without the pledge of its investment certificates, and could collect and
receive charges for loans in advance or otherwise.'8 7 The minimum
capital requirements were again raised. 138  These revisions were sup-
plemented in 1957 by provisions which regulated transactions with per-
sons not residing in California 39 and transactions with officers, directors
and other interested parties. 4 ' Another provision enacted in 1957 ex-
empted loans greater than $10,000 from a number of the Industrial
Loan Law's provisions (primarily those dealing with the maximum al-
lowable loan charges).' 41
Subsequent revisions have further tightened the requirements sur-
rounding industrial loan company operations. Regulation was added
concerning branch offices, and a detailed set of requirements for audits
and financial reports was established. 142  Provisions were added deal-
ing with the nature of real estate loans and their requisite security.1-13
Those portions of the portfolio which consist of loans exceeding
$10,000 or which consist of loans secured by unimproved real property
are limited. 144  The Commissioner was given additional direction relat-
ing to the exercise of his authority for the protection of the public inter-
est.145  Criminal sanctions and, more recently, consumer protection
provisions have been added to curb prohibited practices. 4 0 The new
provisions creating the mortgage banker-ILC also protect against
abuses of the public interest by limiting mortgage banking loans to
amounts of $100,000 or more and limiting the borrowers to partner-
ships or corporations. 47  These provisions assure that the parties
involved are sophisticated and able to fend for themselves, and
therefore less vulnerable to those who "prey upon ignorance or cre-
dulity.' 48  In view of these changes in the Industrial Loan Law, the
public policy concerns of 1934 hardly seem relevant today.
137. CAL. FIN. CODE §18401, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1951, c. 364, at 1117. This
was subsequently amended to provide that an industrial loan company was any corpora-
tion "which in the regular course of its business loans money and issues its own choses
in action under the provisions of this division." CAL. STATS. 1951, c. 421, at 1398.
138. CAL. FIN. CODE §18203.
139. CAL. FIN. CODE §18413.
140. CAL. FIN. CODE §18412.
141. CAL. FIN. CODE §18649.
142. CAL. FI. CODE §§18608-18611.
143. CAL. FIN. CODE §§18406.1, 18406.2.
144. CAL. FIN. CODE §§18682, 18684.
145. CAL. FIN. CODE §§18200.2, 18200.3, 18811, 18813, 18818.
146. CAL. FIN. CODE §§18405.1, 18850 et seq.
147. CAL. FW. CODE §19102. It has been suggested by one writer that since corpo-
rations are protected and supervised by special laws applicable to them alone, they can-
not properly be considered a part of the class which the Usury Law was designed to bene-
fit, namely, the individual necessitous borrower. Coffin, Usury in California, 16 CAL.
L. REv. 281, 290 (1928). Cf. Legislation, 30 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 126, 131 (1955).
148. Cf. In re Fuller, 15 Cal. 2d 425, 439, 102 P.2d 321, 329 (1949).
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Public policy considerations may also be addressed in the context of
the purpose of the 1934 constitutional amendment. As the court point-
ed out in Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co.,, 49 the purpose of the
amendment was to free the legislature from restraints imposed by the
inflexible provisions of the Usury Law, in order that regulations more
appropriate to the business conditions peculiar to each of the exempted
classes could be established. As previously discussed, the legislature
has acted since 1934 to exercise its authority in a series of amendments
to the regulatory provisions of the Industrial Loan Law. It has also
acted to create new classes of industrial loan companies to deal with
changing conditions.
One such entity is the Premium Finance Agency.150 Apparently
because many families were experiencing difficulty making lump sum
premium payments for disaster insurance policies, the legislature felt
it necessary to establish some means under state regulation to provide
credit for them. Thus the Premium Finance Agency was created to
engage in the business of making funds available to an insurer or pro-
ducer at the request of an insured, pursuant to the terms of a premium
finance agreement.'15 In such agreements, the insured agrees to pay
to a company, in installments, the principal amount advanced by the
company to an insurer in payment of premium on an insurance con-
tract, plus charges, "with the assignment as security therefor of the un-
earned premiums, accrued dividends or loss payments .... ,,152
In 1970 the legislature provided for the formation of the Thrift
Guaranty Corporation. 53 This corporation was created to guarantee
the full payment of all principal invested in thrift or investment cer-
tificates, up to $10,000.1" All industrial loan companies which have
these certificates issued and outstanding are required to be members
of this corporation as a condition of doing business.' 55 The Guaranty
Corporation is required to maintain a fund of at least one million dollars
to protect against the possibility that the proceeds from the liquidation
of a member would prove to be insufficient to pay up to $10,000 on
each certificate obligation. 5 6
In 1971 the legislature provided for the incorporation of the Restrict-
ed Industrial Loan Company.'57 This corporation, which has a lower
149. 33 Cal. 2d 564, 579, 203 P.2d 758, 768 (1949).
150. CAL.. FIN. CODE §§18003.1, 18900 et seq.
151. CAL. FIN. CODE §§18003.1, 18900 et seq.
152. CAL. FIN. CODE §18903.
153. CAL. FIN. CODE §18950 et seq.
154. CAL. FIN. CODE §18960.
155. CAL. FIN. CODE §18962.
156. CAL. FIN. CODE §18970.
157. CAL. FIN. CODE §19000 et seq.
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initial capital requirement than that of the standard industrial loan
company, is restricted to the business of making unsecured loans not
exceeding $10,000 in principal amounts to business enterprises for use
solely in connection with those enterprises.15 8
With the rigidity of the Usury Law threatening the economic viability
of nonexempt California lenders, the flexibility of the 1934 constitu-
tional amendment again appears to provide the constitutional authority
for needed legislation. In this context the new provisions creating the
mortgage banker-ILC should be viewed as a further, valid step in the
implementation of the 1934 constitutional amendment.
B. The Equal Protection Challenge
The argument that legislation regulating specific classes of lenders
violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and
the uniform operation requirements of the California Constitution' 5
has generally not been accepted by California courts. In Carter v. Sea-
board Finance Co.,10 for example, legislation setting limits on charges
by pawnbrokers was upheld on the ground that a distinct class existed
whose problems required special treatment. In Carter the specific ex-
emption of the personal property brokers was attacked on the ground
that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution was violated (1) by the establishment of per-
sonal property brokers as a preferred group with respect to the public
in general and other lenders similarly situated and (2) by the establish-
ment of a class of loans (those in excess of $300) which were subject
to less severe restrictions than loans of lesser amounts. The Carter court
rejected these arguments, holding that the equal protection clause does
not prevent classification of loans according to the unique problems pre-
sented by particular types of loans, nor does it prevent classification ac-
cording to the size of the loan.16" ' It had long been recognized that
borrowers of large sums were better able to protect themselves against
excessive charges than were small borrowers. While it was true that per-
sonal property brokers lending sums of more than $300, as well as the
other classes of exempt lenders, were not limited as to interest and
charges, the plan envisioned by the 1934 constitutional amendment was
for the legislature to enact laws with respect to lenders whenever it
deemed it necessary. The plan would not be invalidated simply be-
cause the legislature had found the necessity with respect to some ex-
158. CAL. FIN. CODE §19000.
159. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§11, 21.
160. 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949).
161. ld. at 587-88, 203 P.2d at 772-73.
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empt lenders but not others.' 62 Additionally, in Budget Finance Plan v.
Gamson,163 the court sustained the Personal Property Brokers Act,
holding that in light of -the fact that personal property brokers were
designated as exempt lenders and licensed and regulated by the Com-
missioner, the legislature could reasonably conclude that real property
security was appropriate for loans of $5,000 or more. Moreover, the
court held that the use of real property as security did not destroy the
distinctiveness of the class of lenders.
The decisions reached in Carter and Budget Finance were consistent
with the holding previously reached in In re Fuller.64 In Fuller the
court upheld the provisions of the Small Loan Act, 6 5 which was draft-
ed by the Russell Sage Foundation following its extensive study of the
small loan business and was designed to control the small loan business
in California by the imposition of various licensing requirements and a
regulatory scheme.' 66 It was attacked as a violation of the state and
federal due process and equal protection guarantees because it did not
apply uniformly to all classes of lenders. Instead, it allegedly created
an unreasonable classification in that it applied only to unsecured or
nonexempt lenders, only to loans of $300 or less, and only to non-real
estate loans.'67
In Fuller the California Supreme Court upheld the classification as
a reasonable one, adopting the test established by the United States
Supreme Court in Borden Farm Products v. Baldwin:
When ,the classification made by the legislature is called into ques-
tion, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, there is a presumption of the existence of that state of
facts, and one who assails the classification must carry the burden
of showing by a resort to common knowledge or other matters
which may be judicially noticed, or to other legitimate proof, that
the action is arbitrary.'1 8
The Small Loan Act was expressly inapplicable to those lenders exempt-
ed from the general usury laws by the 1934 constitutional amendment,
including trust companies and licensed real estate brokers.' 69 The
exempt lenders and the trust companies were subject to the control of
162. Id.
163. 34 Cal. 2d 95, 207 P.2d 825 (1949). See also Baruch Inv. Co. v. Huntoon,
257 Cal. App. 2d 485, 65 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1967).
164. 15 Cal. 2d 425, 102 P.2d 321 (1940).
165. CAL. FIN. CODE div. 10 (commencing with §24000).
166. CAL. FiN. CODE ch. 2 (commencing with §24200); ch. 3 (commencing with
§24400).
167. 15 Cal. 2d at 437, 102 P.2d at 328.
168. Id., quoting Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934).
169. CAL. FiN. CODE art. 2 (commencing with §24050).
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the Corporations Commissioner and other regulatory acts which had
been upheld as reasonable. Real estate brokers were subject to the con-
trol of the Real Estate Commissioner. The legislature had reasonably
concluded that this was sufficient to protect the public from abuses by
brokers.170 As for loans of $300 or less, although the size of the in-
dividual transaction was not always a clear measure of the abuse needing
correction, it could "well provide the basis of classification where the
legislature is endeavoring to protect those who borrow small amounts
against the rapacity of those who prey upon ignorance or credu-
lity."171
The rationale of these cases would seem equally applicable in the sit-
uation of the mortgage banker-ILC. In this instance, as in the others,
legislation has been aimed at a class of lenders specified by the 1934
constitutional amendment. This particular lender is distinguished both
by the size of the loan involved and the nature of the regulation estab-
lished. The mortgage banker-ILC may loan only in amounts of $100,-
000 or more, and in order to make these loans the company must be
licensed and submit to an extensive regulatory scheme and the broad
supervisorial authority vested in the Corporations Commissioner. The
class in this instance is further distinguished in that borrowers must be
corporations or partnerships. In light of these factors, the holdings
made in connection with other exempt lender regulations, and the pur-
pose which led to the 1934 constitutional amendment, the legislature
does not appear to have acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner
in passing the mortgage banker-ILC provisions, and the provisions
should be sustained.1 72
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has created a new class of lender exempt
from constitutional usury limitations and thus free from the need to use
stand-by commitments, points, or other devices to charge a market rate
for loans. There is some question, however, whether the newly created
provisions of the Industrial Loan Law are constitutional. Legislative ac-
170. 15 Cal. 2d at 437-38, 102 P.2d at 328.
171. Id. at 438, 102 P.2d at 329.
172. It should be noted that recent case law suggests that the traditional "hands-
off" approach for essentially economic legislation challenged under equal protection may
be giving way to a more demanding standard of review. Gunther, The Supreme Court
1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). In the leading case
adopting this new standard, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971), the United States
Supreme Court maintained that a classification must rest upon some ground of difference
having a "fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Even under this more stringent test, the
provisions creating the mortgage banker-ILC should be sustained.
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tion and prior case law in this area support the argument that the mort-
gage banker-ILC is within the scope of the early Industrial Loan Law
and thus a valid subclass of the industrial loan company. Furthermore,
public policy considerations which attached to the early industrial loan
company do not apply to the newly created mortgage banker-ILC, and
the creation of the new institution does not appear to violate equal pro-
tection of the law. If the provisions are upheld, it is likely that the
mortgage banker-ILC will play a significant role in California commer-
cial real estate lending in the near future.
